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ABSTRACT 
Lawyers and judges who deal with municipal law are perpetually 
puzzled by the distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary” 
powers of local governments. The distinction is murky, inconsistent  
between jurisdictions, inconsistent within jurisdictions, and of limited 
use in predicting how courts will rule. Critics have launched convincing 
attacks on the division of municipal powers into these two categories. 
Most articles have focused on problems with the distinction in specific 
areas of municipal law. In contrast, this article provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the governmental/proprietary distinction in seven specific 
doctrinal areas: legislative grants of municipal authority, government 
contracts, torts, eminent domain, adverse possession, zoning, and  
taxation. The article concludes that confusion with the  
governmental/proprietary distinction will be materially reduced if local 
government powers are conceptually realigned. Instead of completely 
jettisoning the distinction, as some have proposed, the “governmental” 
category should be split in two, with coercive and policymaking powers 
like the police power, law enforcement, and the powers of taxation,  
eminent domain and budgeting constituting a “governmental sovereign 
powers” category. General services that economists call public goods 
should be detached from the governmental sovereign powers and  
regrouped with proprietary services like municipal utilities to create a 
category of “governmental service activities.” The article evaluates the 
new groupings within the context of each of seven substantive areas of 
law where the governmental/proprietary distinction has been used. The 
article concludes that realigning local government powers will reduce 
analytical confusion and help legislators and judges when they make key 
choices in both the lawmaking and litigation context. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The classification of local government powers into “governmental” 
and “proprietary” categories causes more confusion than perhaps any 
other distinction in municipal law. The topic is infrequently addressed in 
academic journals because of the morass of conflicting and seemingly 
irreconcilable cases and outcomes. The most commonly used treatise in 
the field states that whether a municipal corporation is acting in its  
“governmental” or in its “proprietary” (a/k/a “private”) capacity, “is  
often a difficult question to answer, and there is a considerable conflict in 
the decisions of the courts respecting the class to which certain functions 
or powers belong. . . . No hard and fast rule satisfactorily distinguishing 
the one capacity from the other for general application has been  
announced.”1 A 1936 law review article by the former Cincinnati mayor 
and law professor Murray Seasongood argued that “no satisfactory basis 
for solving the problem whether the activity falls into one class or other 
has been evolved. The rules sought to be established are as logical as 
those governing French irregular verbs.”2 In a 1990 article that represents 
the most thorough and thoughtful work on this topic, Suffolk University 
Law Professor Janice C. Griffith observed that the  
“governmental/proprietary distinction has survived in the face of a  
barrage of scholarly and judicial attacks” because, “[l]ike so many other 
mechanical rules in local government law, the test provides the perfect 
mask for judicial balancing of competing equities and policies.”3 
The basic concept underlying the governmental/proprietary  
distinction is that municipalities act in different modes, i.e., sometimes as  
“governments” and sometimes “like businesses,” and that their powers 
and their legal obligations should be treated differently depending on 
which of the two modes they are operating in. However, like many  
dichotomous legal constructs, the theory frequently disintegrates in  
practice. For example, state courts have variously held that a park is a 
governmental function4 and that it is not.5 Operation of a municipal solid 
                                                     
 1. 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.5, at 390–91 (3d ed. 
2005 & Supp. 2015) (footnotes omitted). 
 2. Murray Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or  
Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910, 938 (1936). 
 3. Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping from the  
Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277, 317–18 (1990). 
 4. Fahey v. Jersey City, 244 A.2d 97, 100 (N.J. 1968) (“[T]here is no indication that the  
playground facilities in question were operated for profit, for revenue, or for any reason other than to 
provide for the public health and welfare.”); Etter v. City of Eugene, 69 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Or. 1937) 
(finding that a park is operated “exclusively for the use and enjoyment of the public” and “to  
promote the public health and welfare”). 
 5. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 163 N.E. 732, 734 (N.Y. 1928) (“[T]he establishment of  
municipal playgrounds is in no sense a governmental function.”). 
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waste system has been treated as both “governmental”6 and  
“proprietary.”7 Provision of city fire hydrants has sometimes been  
characterized as a “governmental” activity,8 sometimes as “proprietary”,9 
and sometimes as both.10 Courts have characterized the construction and 
maintenance of public streets and traffic control devices as  
“governmental,”11 but they have also called that activity “proprietary” or 
“private.”12 In a 1911 case considering whether a city’s solid waste  
                                                     
 6. See, e.g., City of Spokane v. Carlson, 436 P.2d 454, 458 (Wash. 1968) (finding that a city 
solid waste system is governmental function “necessary for the comfort, safety, and well-being of 
the city”); Pruett v. Dayton, 168 A.2d 543, 544 (Del. Ch. 1961) (“Under the modern view, the  
disposal of garbage by a governmental subdivision involves a governmental rather than a proprietary 
activity, at least where zoning is involved.”); see also United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v.  
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 342–43, 347 (2007); United Haulers 
Ass’n, 550 U.S. at 368–69 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[A]ny standard ‘that turns on a judicial appraisal 
of whether a particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional” is ‘unsound in principle 
and unworkable in practice.’” (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 
546–47 (1985)). 
 7. See, e.g., Smoak v. City of Tampa, 167 So. 528, 529 (Fla. 1936) (“The difference between 
governmental and corporate duties is sometimes nebulous and difficult to classify, but there is  
certainly nothing connected with garbage disposal that partakes of a public or governmental  
function. It was, consequently, one of the proprietary or corporate duties for the negligent  
performance of which the city may be held liable.”); Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa, 135 So. 
457, 461 (Fla. 1931) (holding that the city operated a garbage incinerator “for its quasi private  
corporate advantage”); City of Pass Christian v. Fernandez, 56 So. 329, 329 (Miss. 1911) (“[T]he 
hauling of dirt and trash is for the use and advantage of the city in its corporate capacity” and “for no 
governmental purpose.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Stiefel v. City of Kent, 132 P.3d 1111, 1114 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (“The fact that 
the same water supply line serves both fire hydrants and the domestic water system does not convert 
a fundamentally governmental function into a proprietary one.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Aschoff v. City of Evansville, 72 N.E. 279, 282–83 (Ind. App. 1904). 
 10. See, e.g., Lober v. Kansas City, 74 S.W.2d 815, 821 (Mo. 1934) (“[I]t is necessary in a 
particular case to distinguish as to which is the primary use and which the incidental use; and it may 
be necessary and proper to inquire, in reference to the particular negligent injury, as to whether the 
particular part or appliance of a waterworks system was devoted solely at the time or generally to a 
governmental function or to a corporate function, or whether the particular act in question was called 
for or caused by a governmental or a proprietary duty.”); Miller Grocery Co. v. City of Des Moines, 
192 N.W. 306, 307 (Iowa 1923) (“It is undoubtedly true that a municipal corporation can exercise its 
dual functions, governmental and proprietary, through the same agents and to a certain extent by the 
same instrumentalities.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Kimmel v. City of Spokane, 109 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Wash. 1941) (finding that the 
regulation of traffic and parking is exercise of governmental police power); Rockingham Square 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Madison, 262 S.E.2d 705, 707 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (determining 
that the power to build and improve streets “is to be exercised in the discretion of the governing 
body of the municipality acting in its governmental, rather than its proprietary, capacity.”); see also 
10A MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 30:38, at 445 (“The management of highways may be  
characterized as a municipal duty relating to governmental affairs.”). 
 12. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Stirrat, 104 P. 834, 836 (Wash. 1909) (“The power to grade 
streets, lay sewers or water pipes, and to lay the cost thereof upon abutting property is not a  
governmental or public function in the strict sense.”); Wittorf v. City of New York, 15 N.E.3d 333, 
337 (N.Y. 2014) (finding that a city employee’s “act of closing the entry to vehicular travel was 
integral to the [street] repair job—a proprietary function”); Johnston v. City of East Moline, 87 
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activities was more appropriately treated as “governmental” or  
“proprietary,” the Supreme Court of Mississippi candidly stated: “It is a 
matter of no little difficulty to define what are and what are not purely 
governmental duties of a city. To a very large extent these questions can 
only be settled by the facts of each particular case, so variant are the 
conditions under which this question arises.”13 These words vividly  
underscore Griffith’s comment that the governmental/proprietary  
distinction allows for fact-driven court decisions, serving as the “perfect 
mask for judicial balancing of competing equities and policies.”14 But the 
outcomes in those judicial decisions are extremely important to litigants 
because deeming an activity governmental or proprietary often  
determines, among other things, whether and how a municipality has the 
authority to act, whether an accident victim can recover against a local 
government, whether a contract with a locality is enforceable, and 
whether zoning regulations apply to construction of a new municipal  
facility. 
A substantial reason for the confusion and for the shifting  
application of the governmental/proprietary categories is that besides the 
competing equities and policies, the governmental/proprietary distinction 
developed in several fields of law, each with its own set of rationales for 
treating a municipal activity as “governmental” or “proprietary.” Judges 
have often quoted another court’s conclusion that a particular local  
government service should be pigeon-holed in one category or the other, 
without looking at the original rationale and the original context. Further, 
because many different rationales were developed for identifying a  
governmental service as either “governmental” or “proprietary,” it  
became easy for courts interested in specific outcomes to find a case with 
a rationale supporting the desired categorization of the service and thus 
the desired result. In her article, Griffith identified a half-dozen doctrinal 
rationales used in court decisions around the country:15 
1. An activity is “governmental” either because it is an attribute of 
sovereignty or because its performance is “essential” or  
“necessary.” This includes functions a municipality must  
perform for the survival and betterment of society, or the  
government can perform more efficiently or fairly than the  
private sector, or private enterprise will not undertake the job.16 
                                                                                                                       
N.E.2d 22, 27–28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1949) (maintenance of signals was a corporate function, not a 
governmental one). 
 13. City of Pass Christian v. Fernandez, 56 So. 329, 329 (Miss. 1911). 
 14. Griffith, supra note 3, at 317–18. 
 15. See id. at 305–16. 
 16. See id. at 306. 
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Attributes of sovereignty include the police power, the power 
of eminent domain, and budgeting and appropriation.17 
2. An activity is “proprietary” because it has traditionally been 
performed by the private sector, such as providing water,  
electricity and gas.18 
3. An activity is “governmental” because it has traditionally been 
performed by governments. 
4. An activity is “governmental” because a state mandates that  
local governments perform it. 
5. An activity is “proprietary” because its performance “primarily 
advances the interests of a local government.” Related cases  
often speak in terms of a municipality acting “for its own  
advantage,” like a corporation.19 
6. An activity is “proprietary” where it involves providing  
services outside its geographic boundaries. 
A recent Washington state case held that a city was authorized to 
impose excise taxes on another government—a public utility district—
because the district was operating in a “proprietary” function. A  
concurring appellate judge in that case provided a somewhat different list 
of what he identified as the six (sometimes conflicting) tests that  
previously had been applied by courts just within that one state:20 
1. A “governmental function” is performed for the common good 
of all, while a “proprietary function” is “for the special benefit 
or profit of the corporate entity.” 
2. A governmental function is based on a municipal corporation 
acting as an arm of the state, while a proprietary function is  
involved when a local government is administering local and 
internal affairs within its territory. 
3. A public entity is proprietary when “it engages in business-like 
activities that are normally performed by private enterprise,” 
while governmental functions are generally performed  
exclusively by governments. 
4. Governmental functions involve performing activities for the 
public health, safety, and welfare. 
                                                     
 17. See id. at 306–07. 
 18. See id. at 310–12. 
 19. See id. at 315. 
 20. See City of Wenatchee v. Chelan Cty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 325 P.3d 419, 431–32 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2014) (Fearing, J., concurring). 
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5. The purchase of a commodity “furnished for comfort by a  
municipality involves a proprietary function.” 
6. A municipality performs a proprietary function when it  
provides a service only to those who request it. 
After expressing his frustration with the overlapping and  
inconsistent tests,21 that appellate judge quoted a 1958 New Jersey  
Supreme Court opinion to the effect that the governmental/proprietary 
“distinction is illusory; whatever local government is authorized to do 
constitutes a function of government, and when a municipality acts  
pursuant to granted authority it acts as government and not as a private 
entrepreneur.”22 
This article will demonstrate that many of the doctrinal theories for 
the governmental/proprietary distinction break down in application. But 
proposals to completely jettison the distinction might go too far. This 
article suggests that there may be circumstances where something like a 
governmental versus proprietary analysis can be helpful. Most of the  
academic articles that have critiqued the distinction have addressed the 
issue in the context of just one doctrinal area or another. Griffith focused 
on local government contracting powers,23 and others focused on  
governmental tort liability,24 zoning,25 eminent domain,26 or adverse  
possession.27 Seasongood’s 1936 article briefly mentioned several areas 
of law,28 with his greatest discussion concentrated on taxes. However, to 
comprehensively evaluate where the governmental/proprietary  
distinction may or may not make sense, one must drill down into each of 
the separate doctrinal areas where the distinction is applied. When we 
recognize the original rationales for characterizing municipal actions as 
“governmental” or “proprietary” in each of the separate fields—grants of 
municipal authority, government contracting, torts, eminent domain,  
                                                     
 21. See id. at 431. 
 22. Id. at 433–34 (quoting Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 141 A.2d 308, 
311 (N.J. 1958)). 
 23. See generally Griffith, supra note 3. 
 24. See generally Mary F. Wyant, The Discretionary Function Exception to Government Tort 
Liability, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 163 (1977). 
 25. See generally Note, Governmental Immunity from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 869 (1971); James B. Sales, Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to  
Governmental Land Use, 39 TEX. L. REV. 316 (1961). 
 26. See generally Note, The Sovereign’s Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of Public 
Property, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1967). 
 27. See generally Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession of Municipal Land: It’s Time to  
Protect This Valuable Asset, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 475 (1998). 
 28. Seasongood mentioned the governmental/proprietary distinction in connection with state 
expropriation of municipal land, liens on public property, basic municipal authority, contracts, torts, 
penalties, and taxation, but went into depth only in the area of taxation. See Seasongood, supra note 
2, at 930–38. 
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adverse possession, zoning, and revenue—we can better evaluate which, 
if any, of those rationales make sense and whether or not the distinction 
might play a useful role within that specific area of law. 
This article analyzes each of the relevant doctrinal fields, and  
proposes that instead of abolishing the governmental/proprietary  
distinction altogether, local government powers should be conceptually 
realigned, with the “governmental” category divided in two. “Sovereign” 
coercive and policymaking powers like the police power, law  
enforcement, and the powers of taxation, eminent domain, budgeting, 
and borrowing should constitute a “governmental sovereign powers”  
category. Other general governmental services like schools, parks and 
roads, which represent “public goods” that are frequently paid for by  
taxes,29 should be realigned with proprietary services that are rate-based 
“private goods”30 like electricity or water. This would create a broader 
category of “governmental service activities.” In this article, the  
proposed new groupings are evaluated within the context of each of the 
seven substantive areas of law where the governmental/proprietary  
distinction has been used. The article argues that this realignment will 
produce more consistent legal analysis and suggests some of the key 
choices that legislators and judges would still have to make when  
deciding policies and cases involving the local government powers  
within each of the realigned categories. 
Part I of this article recounts how the governmental/proprietary  
distinction has been used (and arguably abused) within each of seven 
categories: 
 legislative grants of municipal authority 
 government contracts 
 torts 
 eminent domain 
 adverse possession 
 zoning 
 governmental tax exemptions 
Acknowledging the wide variation nationally and the change in 
doctrine over time, Part I presents representative cases and the various 
rationales for the governmental/proprietary distinction within each  
category. Part II proposes the realignment of municipal activities so that 
                                                     
 29. Economists define “public goods” as goods that benefit everyone more or less equally and 
cannot appropriately be charged to any particular group of “users.” See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 169–89 (2d ed. 2005); DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO POLICY 132–33 (11th ed. 2014). 
 30. “Private goods” are defined and discussed in HYMAN, supra note 29, at 132–33. 
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all of the non-law enforcement services are grouped with the  
“proprietary” services in the single category of “governmental service 
activities.” Part III applies the realigned categories in each of the seven 
doctrinal areas where the governmental/proprietary distinction has made 
a material difference, and discusses the potential benefits of the  
realignment. Finally, this article provides a conclusion and  
recommendations going forward. 
I. DOCTRINAL AREAS USING THE GOVERNMENTAL/PROPRIETARY 
DISTINCTION 
This part reviews the key doctrinal areas in which the  
governmental/proprietary distinction has been applied. It is helpful to 
work through each category in turn. Only by taking the time to examine 
the history and application of the distinction within each doctrinal field 
can we understand why such a morass of conflicting decisions has 
evolved and how we might substitute the current approach with a more 
effective one. 
A. Legislative Grants of Municipal Authority 
The first doctrinal area in which we encounter the  
governmental/proprietary distinction relates to basic powers, i.e.,  
whether or not a local government has been sufficiently authorized by 
state law to engage in an activity, and what auxiliary powers accompany 
the primary grant from the legislature. The generally accepted doctrine is 
that local governments have no inherent powers and derive all their  
powers from their states by constitutional or legislative grant.31 Although 
cities and certain other municipal corporations are frequently granted 
some type of “home rule,”32 the source of home rule powers is either a 
constitutional provision or a statute.33 Because of the enduring influence 
of John F. Dillon’s 1872 treatise on municipal law,34 courts often have 
construed local government powers conservatively, searching for an  
express constitutional or legislative grant of authority for each activity 
                                                     
 31. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1063, 1116–17 
(1980); 2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 10:3, at 383–84; 1 ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 
§ 13.01, at 13–3 (Sandra M. Stevenson ed., 2d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2015). 
 32. See generally DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 
11 (2001). 
 33. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1990). 
 34. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872). See 
the discussion of Dillon infra text accompanying notes 51–55; see also Hugh D. Spitzer, “Home 
Rule” vs. “Dillon’s Rule” for Washington Cities, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 809, 814 (2015). 
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engaged in by a local government.35 At the same time, once a source of 
authority has been identified, courts have often been comfortable  
extending more flexibility to the exercise of powers when they involve 
providing utility and other services that are of the sort commonly  
provided by the private sector.36 The idea is that if a local government is 
operating in a business-like mode, it should be able to make sensible 
business decisions without having to run back to the legislature for  
explicit permission. Examples include the following: implied permission 
to sign a contract creating a lien on agricultural property to which  
electrical power is extended,37 to set airport concessionaire fees,38 to sell 
photographs taken by city staff,39 to carry out the operations of a  
municipal electric utility,40 or to squeeze additional energy from existing 
resources by installing conservation devices in commercial properties.41 
A century ago, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated succinctly: 
The general rule is well established that, where a city is exercising 
governmental powers, it is closely limited, and clear authority for 
each such action must be found in the controlling general or special 
law of the state, but that, when it is exercising the rights of a  
proprietor in the management of its property, its council and officers 
resemble the directors and officers of a private corporation, and, in 
large degree, the powers of these agents and the responsibility of the 
city for their acts are governed by the rules applicable to private 
corporations.42  
Further, without express statutory authority, the exercise of  
governmental powers (particularly the police power) is often limited to 
the area within their boundaries;43 but governments typically can operate 
                                                     
 35. See 2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 10:3, at 378–85. 
 36. See id. § 10:25, at 496–97. 
 37. See Hite v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2, 772 P.2d 481, 483 (Wash. 1989). 
 38. See Branson v. Port of Seattle, 101 P.3d 67, 71 (Wash. 2004). 
 39. See City of Winter Park v. Montesi, 448 So. 2d 1242, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 40. Mines v. Del Valle, 257 P. 530, 535 (Cal. 1927), overruled on other grounds by Stanson v. 
Mott, 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976) (“That the powers of a city of a proprietary character are given a more 
liberal construction than those which are strictly governmental in character is settled beyond  
controversy by the decisions of our courts, and this rule is approved by our best text-writers.”). 
 41. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 743 P.2d 793, 800–01 (Wash. 1987) (“[W]hen 
the Legislature authorizes a municipality to engage in a business, ‘[it] may exercise its business 
powers very much in the same way as a private individual . . . .’” (quoting Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Town of Newport, 228 P.2d 766, 771 (Wash. 1951) (second alteration in original)). 
 42. Audit Co. of New York v. City of Louisville, 185 F. 349, 352 (6th Cir. 1911). 
 43. See 2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 10:8, at 402–08; 6A id. §§ 24:60, 24:61, at 243–52. 
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in a proprietary capacity outside their geographical limits,44 on occasion 
even when a similar proprietary governmental enterprise overlaps.45 
Recognizing that there is wide variation in how courts have  
addressed the issue in different states, we can discern the underlying 
thinking that led to a frequent judicial determination to allow more  
flexibility in construing the scope of authority when local governments 
are carrying out business-like functions. Leading jurists and legal  
academics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were quite 
skeptical of government and were consumed with a fear that government 
at all levels would interfere with individual liberties46 and property,47 
take sides in class conflicts,48 and damage the American economic  
engine.49 Key theorists included Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. 
Tiedeman, and most important here, judge and law professor John F.  
Dillon, who wrote the leading treatise on municipal law.50 “Dillon’s 
Rule” asserted that municipal corporations possess only powers that had 
been “granted in express words, . . . “those necessarily or fairly implied 
in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted, [and] those essential to 
the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.”51 These writers 
were concerned that when government exercised coercive powers, i.e., 
the regulatory “police power,”52 the power to seize private property by 
eminent domain,53 or the power to tax,54 the risks of arbitrary action were 
so high that built-in constraints were necessary. Thus, when exercising 
“strong” powers that might adversely affect rights or property, local  
governments needed to be constrained by being restricted to the specific 
                                                     
 44. See Inc. Town of Sibley v. Ocheyedan Elec. Co., 187 N.W. 560, 564–65 (Iowa 1922); 
Schneider v. City of Menasha, 95 N.W. 94, 95–96 (Wis. 1903). 
 45. Normally, governments are prohibited from regulating or providing services within the 
same territory. See, e.g., S. Park Com’rs v. Chi. City Ry. Co., 122 N.E. 89, 91 (Ill. 1919). But the 
rule against two municipalities operating in the same territory has on occasion been held to apply 
only to governmental functions, not proprietary functions. See, e.g., Town of Newport, 228 P.2d at 
771 (permitting town and public utility district to simultaneously provide electrical utility services 
within the same area); see also 12 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 35:5, at 661–62. 
 46. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 159–61 (1868). 
 47. See, e.g., John F. Dillon, Property—Its Rights and Duties in Our Legal and Social Systems, 
29 AM. L. REV. 161, 175–76 (1895). 
 48. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 26–27 (1954). 
 49. See generally David N. Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G. Tiedeman: A Study in 
the Failure of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 55 MO. L. REV. 93, 98 (1990). 
 50. Id. at 111–12. 
 51. DILLON, supra note 34, § 55, at 101–02 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. § 93, at 136. 
 53. Id. §§ 468–469, at 452–53. 
 54. Id. §§ 605–607, at 576–78; COOLEY, supra note 46, at 235. 
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powers clearly granted by state legislatures or constitutions. On the other 
hand, when municipalities reached into their corporate toolkits for  
devices to carry out responsibilities they had already been entrusted, or 
when providing services in a manner that did not threaten individual 
rights or property, there was less to worry about. A late edition of  
Dillon’s treatise concluded that his rule of strict construction did not 
need to apply “to the mode adopted by the municipality to carry into  
effect powers expressly or plainly granted.”55 
Ironically, the power that Dillon was most worried about—
regulatory “police power”56—was and is an inherent and sovereign  
power of each state.57 It is the oldest area of governmental activity.58 It is 
a power that has been unequivocally granted to general purpose  
governments (e.g., cities and counties).59 Dillon recognized this and  
admonished that the power be applied only for the limited purpose of 
preventing people from acting or using their property in such a way as to 
injure others.60 Later legal thinkers and courts broadened the scope of the 
police power.61 But whether broad or narrow in its reach, regulation of 
human activities so that people can live peaceably remains the core 
“governmental” activity of general municipal government. 
Because police power is an inherent governmental power that is 
necessary for the safety and order of successful communities,  
municipalities have been protected from liability for damages and losses 
incurred by private persons as a result of performing this important  
                                                     
 55. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 239, at 
543 (5th ed. 1911). 
 56. Dillon, supra text accompanying note 47. 
 57. 6A MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 24:2, at 14. 
 58. Local government police powers stretch back to classical times. For example, ancient  
Roman municipal laws included strict land use, public health, and traffic control regulations. See, 
e.g., Law of Caesar on Municipalities and Charter of Urso, both enacted in 44 B.C., translated in 
ALLAN CHESTER JOHNSON, ET AL., ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES 94–95, 99 (1961). 6A MCQUILLIN, 
supra note 1, § 24:2, at 14 (McQuillin notes that the term “police power” goes back to the concept of 
the ancient Greek polis, or city, and notes that Blackstone defined the term “police power” to mean 
that which concerns “the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals 
of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to 
the rules of propriety, good neighborhood and good manners, to be decent, industrious and  
inoffensive in their respective stations.”). 
 59. KRANE, supra note 32, at Appendix Table A10 (listing “City Public Safety” as a regulatory 
power that has been expressly vested in cities in 48 of the 50 of the states, and “City Public Health” 
as a regulatory activity similarly subject to home-rule powers in 27 of the states). 
 60. DILLON, supra note 34, § 93, at 135–36. 
 61. See Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 745, 757 n.70 (2007) (Legarre describes the impact of Ernst Freund’s more expansive view of the 
police power and the broader understanding of appropriate local government regulatory activity that 
took hold during the twentieth century.). See generally ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC 
POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904). 
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governmental function (such as enacting legal regulations that lead to 
private losses) or as a result of not performing this or another function 
because of budget constraints. Typical examples of this protection  
include court rulings that no local government liability arises from  
refusing to issue building permits,62 closing outdoor refreshment stands 
that caused congestion and disruption,63 destroying diseased trees to  
prevent the spread of pests,64 or failing to prevent the World Trade  
Center bombing from occurring.65 As discussed later,66 sovereign  
immunity, discretionary immunity, and related doctrines have  
historically shielded local governments from tort liability for actions in 
the exercise of their regulatory and their law enforcement powers. In  
Justice Robert Jackson’s words, “it is not a tort for government to  
govern.”67 
But, as noted above,68 there is doctrinal confusion about whether 
municipal police powers are protected as “governmental” because they 
are “essential and necessary” to the community, because they are “for the 
common good,” because they “protect public health and safety,” because 
they are “inherent” and “sovereign,” because they are carried out as  
extensions of state power, or simply because they have historically been 
performed by local governments. Whatever the reasons given, the  
doctrine remains that authority to carry out “governmental” tasks need to 
be expressly granted, and more flexibility is accorded when carrying out 
activities characterized as “proprietary” in nature. 
B. Government Contracts 
The distinction between “governmental” and “proprietary”  
functions of municipalities has also been significant in the area of  
government contracts—specifically with respect to agreements that 
might be said to “contract away” basic governmental powers. This is the 
area in which Griffith focused her critique of the  
governmental/proprietary distinction. As she carefully documented, early 
nineteenth-century courts were concerned about government contracts 
that would bind future legislatures and thereby short circuit the  
democratic decisionmaking process.69 There arose a doctrine that certain 
                                                     
 62. See, e.g., Akin v. City of Miami, 65 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 1953). 
 63. Belle Isle Grill Corp. v. City of Detroit, 666 N.W.2d 271, 274, 281–82 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2003). 
 64. In re 14255 53rd Ave. S., 86 P.3d 222, 229 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 65. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 957 N.E.2d 733, 745–46 (N.Y. 2011). 
 66. See infra Part I.C. 
 67. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 15–21. 
 69. See Griffith, supra note 3, at 286–90. 
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governmental powers were “inalienable” and could not be ceded by  
contract. The most important of these inalienable powers was the police 
power. In Corporation of Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor of New 
York,70 an 1826 court held that despite a City of New York deed  
promising that a church could use a parcel of land as a cemetery, the 
deed could not abrogate the City’s independent police power authority to 
prohibit burials as a public health matter. The court ruled that the church 
claim against the City was no different than if the City had been a private 
individual and a governmental body had imposed a health and safety 
regulation rendering the covenant useless.71 Although the United States 
Supreme Court had ruled earlier that the Constitution barred states from 
legislatively impairing contracts with or between private parties,72 the 
Court eventually accepted the Brick Presbyterian Church principle that 
the no-impairment clause did not block a proper exercise of the police 
power.73 State courts have consistently held that governmental regulatory 
functions could not be contracted away because regulation is so  
fundamental to what government (and only government) does, i.e.,  
exercise “the power of self-protection on the part of the community.”74 
Courts have ruled, for example, that a city cannot yield its police power 
control over the use of streets and parkways by franchise or contract,75 or 
agree not to exercise zoning powers.76 
But the police power is not the only “governmental” function that 
courts have treated as inalienable and unalterable by the terms of a  
contract. For example, when a school district reneged on a decision to 
open an experimental high school in Kansas City, Missouri, advocates 
for the school brought an action for specific performance, arguing that an 
earlier school board decision created an enforceable obligation. The 
school supporters went so far as to suggest that operation of a school was 
proprietary in character. But the Missouri Court of Appeals held that  
although a municipal corporation may, by contract, limit exercise of its 
proprietary functions, it cannot limit its “governmental functions” and 
                                                     
 70. See generally 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826). 
 71. See id. at 540–41. 
 72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 73. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877) (“[T]he police power” extends 
“to the protection of the lives, health, and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good 
order and the public morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the power to 
provide for these objects.”). See the discussion of this and related cases in Griffith, supra note 3, at 
293–98. 
 74. See City of Akron v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 78 N.E.2d 890, 895 (Ohio 1948). 
 75. See Wills v. City of Los Angeles, 287 P. 962, 963 (Cal. 1930); State ex rel. Townsend v. 
Bd. of Park Comm’rs of Minneapolis, 110 N.W. 1121, 1123 (Minn. 1907). 
 76. See County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340, 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); 
Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick Cty. Comm’rs, 33 P.3d 869, 871 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). 
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that if education were treated as a proprietary function “what possible 
function could be considered governmental?”77 In another case, the  
Minnesota Supreme Court held that city decisions about the ownership 
and management of public parkways, parks, and public grounds were 
“legislative,” and the control of those decisions could not be limited on 
contractual grounds.78 As discussed in more detail below, basic powers 
necessary to support and implement municipal programs, like taxation79 
and eminent domain,80 are also frequently treated as being protected from 
constraint by contracts. 
In contrast, when a local government operates in a “proprietary” 
capacity, its contractual arrangements are routinely treated as binding on 
its future decision-makers and future choices, just as they would be if the 
municipality were a private sector entity. For example, in Incorporated 
Town of Sibley v. Ocheyedan Electric Co.,81 the Iowa Supreme Court 
held in 1922 that as a general matter a town could enter into a power 
sales contract with a nearby private electric utility, including energy 
prices effective for the life of the agreement. The court ruled that the 
municipal utility could 
buy for the use of the municipality in the open market in  
accordance with its needs, and make binding and enforceable 
contracts for such purchases. It also may sell in the world at 
large such commodities belonging to the municipality as it may 
legally have a right and authority to sell. It is governed in its 
proprietary capacity by the same rules that govern private  
individuals or corporations.82  
Similarly, Florida’s Supreme Court in 1929 held that a city electric utility 
could commit itself to wiring private homes in order to encourage the 
increased use of electricity, noting that the city in that instance, was  
“operating and maintaining a public utility as more or less of a business 
venture, and the court should not interfere with the reasonable discretion 
of the properly constituted officers or authorities in the operation of such 
venture.”83 A Washington state public utility district was permitted to 
enforce a contractual lien on a wholesale customer’s property when that 
customer refused to pay its bill. Washington’s high court wrote:84 “When 
                                                     
 77. Coal. to Pres. Educ. on the Westside v. Sch. Dist. of Kan. City, 649 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1983). 
 78. Townsend, 110 N.W. at 1124. 
 79. See infra notes 172–184 and accompanying text. 
 80. See infra notes 140–153 and accompanying text. 
 81. Inc. Town of Sibley v. Ocheyedan Elec. Co., 187 N.W. 560, 564 (Iowa 1922). 
 82. Id. at 563. 
 83. Hamler v. City of Jacksonville, 122 So. 220, 221 (Fla. 1929). 
 84. Hite v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 2, 772 P.2d 481, 483 (Wash. 1989) (quoting Puget Sound Power 
& Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 565 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977)). 
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acting as a private business, a municipal corporation ‘is implicitly  
authorized to make all contracts and to engage in any undertaking which 
is necessary to render the system efficient and beneficial to the public.’” 
There is an obvious logic to the broadly accepted principle that a 
local government should not be permitted to contract away its regulatory 
authority. The rule has sometimes been characterized as being necessary 
to protect the discretion of later democratically elected leaders. But at the 
same time, councillors who govern a city’s electric utility will likewise 
have their discretion constrained by existing contracts, and those  
contractual constraints are widely permitted. The better rationale is  
simply that the police power, and the discretionary authority to adjust 
regulations as human environments and dangers evolve, must be  
preserved to protect public health and safety on a continuing basis. This 
understanding was stated clearly in Brick Presbyterian Church,85 the 
1826 decision permitting the City of New York to impose a no-burials 
rule on a church that had purchased land for a graveyard from the City 
six decades before. In that ruling, the court noted that sixty years earlier 
the property had been outside the city’s inhabited area, and “it never  
entered into the contemplation of either party, that the health of the city 
might require the suspension, or abolition of that right.”86 The opinion 
held that it would “be unreasonable in the extreme, to hold that the 
[church] should be at liberty to endanger not only the lives of [the  
parishioners], but also those of the citizens generally, because their lease 
contains a covenant for quiet enjoyment.”87 
The courts have not restricted themselves to a dichotomy between 
the police power and proprietary powers; instead, the distinction has 
been drawn as governmental versus proprietary powers. The concept of 
“governmental” activity is much broader, and, as Griffith documented, 
concepts of essential “governmental” functions evolved and accreted 
over time.88 Eighteenth and early nineteenth-century city governments 
focused on public health and safety, i.e., the police power.89 However, 
over the course of the nineteenth century expectations of “governmental” 
activity increasingly included streets, waterworks, other public works, 
parks museums, libraries, zoos, and artistic displays.90 When the legal 
concept of limiting the contracting away of “governmental” powers was 
developed, the focus was on maintaining the police power and other 
                                                     
 85. 5 Cow. 538, 542 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826). 
         86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Griffith, supra note 3, at 320–21. 
 89. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ORIGINS OF MODERN 
URBAN GOVERNMENT, 1650–1825, at 52–55 (1975). 
 90. Id. at 91–92, 114–15. 
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powers that were unique to government. As the public’s expectations of 
“governmental” activities evolved to include a wider range of public  
services, or as the privatization movement has reassigned delivery of 
some services back to the private sector, the legal doctrine stayed by and 
large the same, i.e., whatever is in the “governmental” powers box 
should not be contracted away, but powers in the “proprietary” box can 
be. In addition, as Griffith observed, assignments of activities to one box 
or the other that were developed in other fields of law, and the doctrines 
justifying those assignments, bled over into the analysis of what types of 
powers could or could not be contracted away.91 These include doctrines 
related to tort liability, condemnation, tax exemptions, and adverse  
possession—fields that Griffith did not analyze in detail. We will next 
focus on these other doctrinal areas and see how the use of the  
governmental versus proprietary distinction developed and caused  
considerable bewilderment in each of those fields—with confusion  
emanating from torts in particular, where the desire to compensate  
people in sorry circumstances stretched the boundaries of what are  
understood to be “proprietary” actions by governments. 
C. Tort Liability 
The governmental/proprietary distinction appears more often in tort 
cases than in any other field, typically when courts are considering 
whether or not a governmental entity should be subject to suit for  
allegedly tortious actions. There is considerable variation in how courts 
and legislatures have handled the governmental/proprietary distinction in 
the area of tort liability, and both the common law and statutes have  
altered the playing field within each state. The cases discussed below are 
meant to illustrate the challenges that judges and lawmakers have  
confronted when applying the distinction and to show how the labeling 
of municipal activities as either “governmental” or “proprietary” for tort 
law purposes affected the characterization of those activities in other  
areas of law. 
1. Sovereign Immunity 
The background issue is the common law doctrine of “sovereign 
immunity” of states from suit92 (at least for their “governmental”  
                                                     
 91. Griffith, supra note 3, at 325–26. 
 92. A distinction is sometimes made between the “sovereign immunity” of states and the  
“governmental immunity” of their political subdivisions. 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ITS DIVISIONS, AGENCIES, AND OFFICERS § 1:1, at 1-3 to 1-6 (rev. 2d ed. 
2008 & Supp. 2015). For simplicity, this article will refer to both doctrines as “sovereign immunity.” 
There also exists a related doctrine, that governments are immune from statutes of limitations—at 
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activities) and the related doctrines of discretionary immunity and public 
duty. Sovereign immunity in America has its roots in the English law 
concept that the King’s own courts (or at least most of his courts) were 
without jurisdiction to entertain a lawsuit against the sovereign.93 This 
doctrine was accepted in the early American Republic without question 
and for many years maintained without thoughtful legal analysis.94 In 
1869, two Supreme Court cases offered something in the way of a  
rationale, i.e., that, (1) without protection from a lawsuit, governments 
could not effectively perform their duties,95 and (2) “inconvenience and 
danger . . . would follow from any different rule.”96 Whether based on 
stare decisis, or a possible misunderstanding of English law, or unstated 
policy and financial considerations, nineteenth-century state courts,  
beginning with Massachusetts in 1812,97 held that tort claims against 
municipalities for their “governmental” activities were available only in 
limited circumstances, if at all. The twentieth century witnessed a drive 
to circumscribe or eliminate the sovereign immunity doctrine because of 
its perceived unfairness to injured persons,98 and in many states the 
common law doctrine was rejected or sharply limited through legislative 
or judicial action, or both. As of 2002, the common law doctrine of  
sovereign immunity for local governments had been abrogated in at least 
thirty states.99 In most instances, judicial rejection of sovereign immunity 
was followed by statutes permitting it to continue for specific categories 
of government actions.100 However, prior to the elimination or  
                                                                                                                       
least when acting in their governmental rather than their proprietary capacity. See, e.g., City of  
Moses Lake v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1170–74 (E.D. Wash. 2006). 
 93. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE TORT LIABILITY OF 
GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS 1 (1979). 
 94. Id. at 1–3. 
 95. Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868). 
 96. The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868). 
 97. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 249 (1812). 
 98. The anti-sovereign immunity movement gained impetus from the publication of Edwin M. 
Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924) and subsequent articles by  
Borchard criticizing sovereign immunity. See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 93, at 5. 
More recently, the constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that notwithstanding early 
Supreme Court acceptance of sovereign immunity, the concept is foreign to American notions of 
redress against government wrongs and should be found unconstitutional. See Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001). 
 99. 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ITS DIVISIONS, AGENCIES, 
AND OFFICERS, supra note 92, § 1:9, at 1-37 to 1-40. 
 100. Id. § 1:11, at 1-48 to 1-52. Judicial abrogation followed by adoption of statutes include, 
for example, Illinois (Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959), 
followed by enactment of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity 
Act, §§ 1–101 to 10–101, 1965 Ill. Laws 2982 (codified as amended at 745 Ill. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
10/3–108 (West 2015))); Missouri (Jones v. State Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 231 (Mo. 
1977), followed by adoption of Act of June 8, 1978, 1978 Mo. Laws 982 (1979) (codified as  
amended at MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.600, 537.610 (West 2015))); and Indiana (Campbell v. State, 
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modification of sovereign immunity in each state, judicial rulings often 
had already sliced “proprietary” activities from sovereign immunity’s 
shield; the concept was that when governments acted like private sector 
actors they should be similarly liable for damages they caused. An early 
example from 1842 is Bailey v. Mayor of New York.101 New York City’s 
water commission had constructed a dam in Westchester County for 
drinking water purposes. Negligent operation of the facility damaged the 
plaintiffs’ properties, but when they commenced legal action, the water 
commission asserted that as a municipal body it was immune from suit. 
The court permitted the claim to proceed, outlining the distinction  
between a government acting in its “public” character and acting like a 
private entity: 
[T]he distinction is quite clear and well settled, and the process of 
separation practicable. To this end, regard should be had, not so 
much to the nature and character of the various powers conferred, as 
to the object and purpose of the legislature in conferring them. If 
granted for public purposes exclusively, they belong to the  
corporate body in its public, political or municipal character. But if 
the grant was for purposes of private advantage and emolument, 
though the public may derive a common benefit therefrom, the  
corporation . . . is to be regarded as a private company. It stands on 
the same footing as would any individual or body of persons upon 
whom the like special franchises had been conferred.102  
In its ruling the court reasoned that although a public entity, the  
water commission was similar to the private corporations that were  
routinely chartered in the first half of the nineteenth century to carry out 
projects of direct or indirect benefit to the general public, such as the  
creation of banks and railroads.103 At that time there was a porous 
boundary between public and private corporations,104 and the Bailey 
opinion noted that a private corporation rather than a city commission 
could readily have been chartered to provide drinking water to New York 
City; accordingly, there was no reason not to treat the City’s water  
enterprise differently than an analogous private entity for tort liability 
                                                                                                                       
284 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1972), followed by enactment of Act of Feb. 19, 1974, Pub. L. No. 142, 1974 
Ind. Laws 599). 
 101. See generally Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). 
 102. Id. at 539. 
 103. Id. at 543–44. For a discussion of the gradual shift from private or semi-private  
corporations for public benefit to private corporations for entirely private purposes, see BRIAN 
BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 246–50 (2009); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 188–201 (2d. ed. 1985); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, 109–14 (1977). 
 104. HORWITZ, supra note 103, at 113–14. 
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purposes.105 The concept of tort liability for proprietary activities of  
government became a widely accepted doctrine, but the distinction  
between “public” or “governmental” activities on the one hand, and  
“private” or “proprietary” activities on the other, was never easily 
drawn.106 When courts desired to allocate damage to a local government 
entity, a frequent approach was to determine that the governmental  
defendant was acting in its “proprietary” capacity and thus could be held 
financially responsible. Nevertheless, there continued to be many  
instances where damaging governmental action or inaction was not  
subject to suit,107 including a recent example in In re World Trade Center 
Bombing Litigation,108 where the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey was held immune from suit for failure to provide sufficient  
security in a bombed parking garage because the Port Authority police 
were performing a “governmental” function.109 It is easy to accept that 
municipal electric, water, and certain other utilities are appropriately 
deemed “proprietary,”110 but there are many instances in which  
seemingly routine “governmental” activities were transformed into  
“proprietary” actions. These include the following rulings: that heirs of a 
drowned man could recover from a town because provision of a  
municipal park was not “governmental” owing to the town operating it 
                                                     
 105. Bailey, 3 Hill at 540. 
 106. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 53:70, at 501–03. 
 107. See, e.g., Austin v. City of Baltimore, 405 A.2d 255, 259–60 (Md. 1979) (holding that the 
operation of a day camp where a child died is the governmental function of recreation, so no  
negligence action could be maintained against the city); Rankin v. Sch. Dist. No. 9, 23 P.2d 132, 133 
(Or. 1933) (finding that a person injured by negligent operation of a school bus could not recover 
because the school district was operating in a governmental capacity); Maxmilian v. City of New 
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solely for public benefit); Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa 495, 499 (Iowa 1872) (determining that 
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but in discharging “legislative and governmental” functions like public health, a city is “not  
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examples, see 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 53:2 nn.5–7, at 158–60. 
 108. 957 N.E.2d 733 (N.Y. 2011). 
 109. Id. at 735. Another recent example is Crouch v. City of Kansas City, 444 S.W.3d 517, 
524–26 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014), where a city firefighter’s assistance in moving a disabled person was 
treated as a governmental, rather than a proprietary, service, so although the individual died as a 
result of the move, the city was immune from a wrongful death suit under the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. 
 110. See, e.g., Junior Coll. Dist. v. City of St. Louis, 149 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Mo. 2004) (holding 
that a city engaged in a proprietary function when it operated the water system, even though the 
system was also used for firefighting); Peavey v. City of Miami, 1 So. 2d 614, 636–37 (Fla. 1941) 
(finding that a pilot who crashed into construction equipment on a runway could sue the city because 
airport operation is proprietary in character); Davoust v. City of Alameda, 84 P. 760, 762 (Cal. 1906) 
(determining that the wife of a pedestrian killed by a loose electric wire near a power plant could 
maintain an action because the city was clearly operating in a proprietary capacity). 
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voluntarily rather than carrying out a mandatory duty for the benefit of 
the general public;111 that construction and maintenance of public  
highways was “proprietary” so the state was subject to a suit for an auto 
passenger’s wrongful death;112 that operation of a city auditorium was 
“proprietary” when an event held there was not strictly governmental in 
nature, and thus the family of a woman killed in the collapse of an  
adjoining platform could maintain an action against the city;113 and that a 
bicyclist injured when she hit a pothole negligently repaired by city  
personnel could recover because filling potholes is typically done by the 
private sector under contract so when city staff undertake the work they 
should be treated as operating in a “proprietary” manner.114 
The desire to enable people to recover for serious injuries or death 
led many courts to develop new theories to stretch the definition of  
“proprietary” activities.115 One treatise puts it as follows: “In efforts to 
avoid the often harsh results occasioned by a literal application of the 
test, courts frequently created highly artificial and elusive  
distinctions . . . .”116 While in most states the sovereign immunity  
doctrine was gradually limited by court rulings and statutes,117 other  
rulings had already muddied the governmental/proprietary boundaries 
and the language of these opinions—whether clear or confused—flowed 
into altogether different areas of municipal law where the  
proprietary/governmental distinction also made a difference, i.e., local 
government authority, contracting, and property ownership. In addition, 
as blanket sovereign immunity waned, there remained related concepts 
that shielded governments from tort liability for policy and resource  
allocation choices—the discretionary immunity doctrine and the public 
duty doctrine. These doctrines have demonstrated some resilience  
because of a widely held view that, as Justice Jackson stated, “It is not a 
tort for government to govern.”118 Understanding the discretionary  
immunity and public duty doctrines can assist in analyzing whether and 
when the governmental/proprietary distinction (or something like it) can 
make sense in the tort context. 
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 113. Chafor v. City of Long Beach, 163 P. 670, 674 (Cal. 1917). 
 114. Wittorf v. City of New York, 15 N.E.3d 333, 335, 337 (N.Y. 2014). 
 115. See the competing theories underpinning a “governmental” and “proprietary” distinction 
discussed supra text accompanying notes 15–20. 
 116. 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 92, § 2:1,  
at 2-7. 
 117. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 118. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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2. Discretionary Immunity 
The concept of “discretionary immunity” of municipal governments 
was well-established by the time that Dillon published his treatise in 
1872. He reported on a number of state cases holding that a “municipal 
corporation is not liable to an action for damages either for the  
non-exercise of, or for the manner in which in good faith it exercises, 
discretionary powers of a public or legislative character.”119 As more 
state courts and legislatures abrogated blanket sovereign immunity, the 
discretionary immunity doctrine was often retained because of a  
recognition that certain activities can be effectively performed only by 
governments, in part because of the recognized inherent risks involved 
(such as law enforcement and fire suppression).120 Discretionary  
immunity was also built into the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946.121 
Although considerable litigation ensued regarding which decisions were 
at the discretionary “planning level” and which were at the  
nondiscretionary “operational level,”122 the concept of tort immunity for 
basic policy decisions stuck. A principal rationale for discretionary  
immunity has been separation of powers, i.e., that in our political system 
certain basic policy decisions are vested in the legislative and executive 
branches and that judical review of those decisions would be  
inappropriate. This rationale was voiced in 1968 by the Supreme Court 
of California123 and supported in 1980 by the United States Supreme 
Court in a civil rights case.124 There have been numerous opinions  
parsing out the scope and reach of discretionary immunity, distinguishing 
between “discretionary” and “ministerial” functions;125 determining 
whether government liability can arise only from actions analogous to 
                                                     
 119. DILLON, supra note 34, § 753, at 709 (emphasis added). 
 120. Wyant, supra note 24, at 164; see, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2–201 (West 2015) 
(“Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the 
determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act 
or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though 
abused.”). 
 121. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012) (“Any claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or 
an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”). 
 122. Wyant, supra note 24, at 169–70. 
 123. Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 360 (Cal. 1968) (stating that there needs to be “an  
assurance of judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for [b]asic policy decisions has 
been committed to coordinate branches of government”) (emphasis added). 
 124. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648 (1980) (“For a court or jury, in the 
guise of a tort suit, to review the reasonableness of the city’s judgment on these matters would be an 
infringement upon the powers properly vested in a coordinate and coequal branch of government.”). 
 125. 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 92, § 2:5,  
at 2-40 to 2-46. 
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private acts;126 deciding which legislative or judicial (or  
“quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial”) functions are immune;127 and 
describing the policymaking or planning decisions that constitute the 
hallmark of discretionary immunity.128 But the bottom line is that  
government officials have to make policy choices vested in them without 
second-guessing from the judiciary—even when those decisions result in 
harm to someone, like budget choices that cut police or fire services129 or 
that omit potentially life-saving barriers from a highway improvement 
capital program.130 
3. Public Duty Doctrine 
Somewhat related to discretionary immunity is the public duty  
doctrine, which holds that when providing quintessentially governmental 
tasks such as police and fire protection or the enforcement of laws and 
ordinances, a government cannot be held liable in tort to an individual 
because the duty to provide that protection or enforcement is owed only 
to the public at large.131 Interwoven with the public duty doctrine is the 
idea that there is a lack of tort liability in the first place when  
governments simply do what they are supposed to do. This is particularly 
true in connection with the exercise of the police power and law  
enforcement. When government acts to protect the public, there can be 
uncompensated costs to individuals. For example, neither recoverable 
damage nor a taking is said to occur if a health department destroys  
diseased animals132 or infected trees,133 or if homes are destroyed to  
prevent the spread of a fire.134 
                                                     
 126. Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 407 P.2d 440, 444 (Wash. 1965) 
(holding that the state tort claims act “does not render the state liable for every harm that may flow 
from governmental action, or constitute the state a surety for every governmental enterprise  
involving an element of risk”). 
 127. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957); Wyant, supra note 24, 
at 179–80. 
 128. 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 92, § 2:7,  
at 2-55 to 2-62; see, e.g., Carlson v. State, 598 P.2d 969, 972 (Alaska 1979) (“[D]ecisions that rise to 
the level of planning or policy-making are considered discretionary acts which do not give rise to 
tort liability, while decisions that are merely operational in nature are not considered to be  
discretionary acts and therefore are not immune from liability.”). 
 129. Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. 1972) (noting, in a decision abrogating 
sovereign immunity doctrine, that governments cannot be liable for all acts or omissions that cause 
damage; for example, “one may not claim a recovery because a city or state failed to provide  
adequate police protection to prevent crime”). 
 130. See, e.g., Avellaneda v. State, 273 P.3d 477, 480–81 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). 
 131. 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 92, § 2:20,  
at 2-152 to 2-170. 
 132. Clark v. City of Draper, 168 F.3d 1185, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 133. In re 14255 53rd Ave. S., 86 P.3d 222, 225–26 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
 134. Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1879). 
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Under the public duty doctrine, government is acting to protect and 
assist the general public. Accordingly, when government agents in good 
faith do not act, e.g., when city inspectors fail to identify a potential gas 
leak,135 a state agency does not inspect an amusement park ride,136 or a 
city does not maintain a fire hydrant,137 normally no duty is owed to an 
injured person because of the relevant government’s inaction. The  
flip side of the public duty doctrine is that when governmental actors 
either purposely or inadvertently create a special relationship with the 
person who is subsequently injured, a “special duty” is created and the 
governmental entity may be held liable.138 The classic example is when a 
911 operator assures a caller that “help is on the way” to the caller’s 
house, a special duty arises, and the city might be held liable for failure 
to direct police to the correct address or to redirect officers when they 
could not locate the house.139 Although the public duty doctrine has been 
criticized as an unintended “backdoor version” of sovereign immunity,140 
it continues to be applied in at least sixteen states141 with respect to  
“governmental” functions and is viewed as protecting state and local  
entities when they are doing what they are supposed to do.142 
D. Property Law 
Another area of law where the governmental/proprietary distinction 
appears is in the law involving property, specifically with respect to  
eminent domain, adverse possession, and zoning. 
1. Eminent Domain 
The exercise of eminent domain is an inherent sovereign power of 
the states, and, regardless of governmental or proprietary capacities, local 
governments in most jurisdictions exercise eminent domain only with a 
clear grant of authority from a state constitution or statute.143 Eminent 
domain is one of the “strong” governmental powers that local  
                                                     
 135. O’Connor v. City of New York, 447 N.E.2d 33, 34–35 (N.Y. 1983). 
 136. Cormier v. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 745 So. 2d 1, 8 (La. 1999). 
 137. Gates v. Town of Chandler, 725 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Boyle v. Anderson 
Fire Fighters Ass’n Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
 138. 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 92, § 2:21,  
at 2-171 to 2-177. 
 139. De Long v. County of Erie, 457 N.E.2d 717, 721–22 (N.Y. 1983). 
 140. Cummins v. Lewis County, 133 P.3d 458, 466 (Wash. 2006). 
 141. 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 92, § 2:20,  
at 2-160 to 2-162. 
 142. Id. § 2:21, at 2-171 to 2-177. It should be noted that the public duty doctrine has spawned 
an array of approaches focused on the breadth of public duty and types of actions that can cause a 
special duty to be created. Id. 
 143. 11 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 32:11, at 441–43, 32:59, at 704–06. 
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governments normally cannot contract away.144 In condemnation law, the 
governmental/proprietary distinction comes into play mainly when the 
power of eminent domain is being brought to bear against local  
government property. In many states, whether the property is to be used 
in a governmental or proprietary mode makes a difference both in 
whether it can be condemned and in the level of compensation paid. The 
common law rule is that property held by a municipal corporation and 
used for a public purpose cannot be condemned for other public purposes 
absent express statutory authority,145 although many statutes do provide 
that authority.146 For example, in Village of Blue Ash v. City of  
Cincinnati,147 the Ohio Supreme Court held that a city could not, for a 
proprietary purpose (an airport), condemn another municipality’s  
property that was already in use for a governmental purpose.148 This 
“prior public use” principle can also apply to attempts to condemn a 
piece of “governmental” land for a new “governmental” purpose,149 but 
the prior public use doctrine seems to have the most salience when  
protecting “governmental” property from condemnation for “proprietary” 
purposes.150 
The governmental/proprietary distinction is most significant in  
determining the compensation paid to a local government when its  
property is taken. In many jurisdictions, a state can condemn municipal 
property held for a public use without paying any compensation  
whatsoever to the local government.151 The rationale is that when acting 
in a governmental capacity, local governments are acting on behalf of 
their states, and, absent a statutory requirement, nothing “prohibits the 
State from taking its creatures’ property without providing  
                                                     
 144. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 435–36 (1934); W. River 
Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 538–39 (1848). 
 145. 11 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 32:79.3, at 790–92. 
 146. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 8.12.030 (2014) (authorizing cities to “condemn land and 
property, including state, county and school lands and property” for a wide variety of city purposes); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 20–3–58 (West 2015) (permitting condemnation of public property permitted for 
university purposes); see also 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5:06[8], at 5-328 (Matthew  
Bender Elite Products 3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2015). 
 147. 182 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio 1962). 
 148. Id. at 561–62; see also City of Worthington v. City of Columbus, 796 N.E.2d 920,  
924–26 (Ohio 2003) (The Ohio Supreme Court applied the same “prior public use” principle, ruling 
that one city could not condemn park land within its boundaries that was owned by another city in 
order to build a cemetery.). 
 149. See generally The Sovereign’s Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of Public  
Property, supra note 26. 
 150. See, for example, State v. Super. Ct. for Jefferson Cty., 157 P. 1097, 1098–99 (Wash. 
1916) for the general principle that authority to condemn public land applies only to land held in 
proprietary capacity. 
 151. 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 146, § 2.27, at 2-142 to 2-147;  
2 id. § 5:06[8] at 5-328. 
198 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:173 
compensation.”152 On the other hand, if a municipality holds land for a 
proprietary purpose, the state’s condemnation of that property is treated 
as equivalent to condemnation of private land, and compensation must be 
paid.153 Further, when eminent domain statutes do require that  
governments be compensated for condemned “governmental” property, 
those entities will typically be paid a full “replacement cost” or  
“substitution cost,” which is financially favorable to them.154 But  
compensation for the taking of property of a proprietary enterprise will 
be comparable to what a private property owner would receive, i.e., fair 
market value, which may or may not be sufficient to replace the asset.155 
The governmental/proprietary difference in compensating for condemned 
public property has been criticized in part because the courts are  
inconsistent in determining whether an activity is best placed in the 
“governmental” or “proprietary” box, and in part because local residents 
with their “taxpayer” hats on are harmed by a state taking just as much as 
they are when wearing their utility “ratepayer” hats.156 One commentator 
argued cogently that if the state can seize a piece of municipal property 
without compensation, “it places an inequitable burden on a relatively 
small, discrete group—the citizens of the municipal corporation.”157 
Nevertheless, the distinction remains an active principle in the  
condemnation law of some states. 
2. Adverse Possession 
There is a widely applied doctrine that governmental property held 
for a public use is immune from adverse possession.158 The rationales 
include the concept that the legislature is unable to effectively supervise 
lands dedicated to public uses;159 that land held in trust for the public 
cannot be transferred without express legislative authorization;160 and 
that statutes of limitation do not apply to public uses.161 But in some 
                                                     
 152. Comm’rs of Highways v. United States, 653 F.2d 292, 297 (7th Cir. 1981); see also The 
Sovereign’s Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of Public Property, supra note 26, at 1089. 
 153. See, e.g., City of Cambridge v. Comm’r of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Mass. 
1970); Town of Winchester v. Cox, 26 A.2d 592, 594–95 (Conn. 1942); Village of Canajoharie v. 
State, 184 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872–73 (App. Div. 1959); 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 
146, § 5.06[8], at 5-329 to 5-333. 
 154. 5 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 146, § 18.06, at 18-37 to 18-39. 
 155. Id. 
 156. The Sovereign’s Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of Public Property, supra note 
26, at 1097–98. 
 157. Id. at 1110. 
 158. 10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 28:71, at 445. (listing examples from twenty-two states in 
which public use property is not susceptible to adverse possession). 
 159. City of Oakland v. Oakland Water-Front Co., 50 P. 277, 282 (Cal. 1897). 
 160. Montgomery County v. Md.-Wash. Metro. Dist., 96 A.2d 353, 357 (Md. 1953). 
 161. City of South Greenfield v. Cagle, 591 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
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states neither the legislatures nor the courts have made it clear that all 
public property, regardless of purpose, is so protected; in those  
jurisdictions, proprietary uses often are not treated as public uses, and 
proprietary property is susceptible to acquisition by adverse possession. 
For example, the Oregon Supreme Court held in 1931 that a city’s water 
rights could be lost to a private property owner because the “power to 
provide a water system is not governmental or legislative in character, 
but strictly proprietary, and the city engaged in the prosecution of such 
an improvement and selling water for gain is clothed in such authority 
and subject to the same liabilities as a private person.”162 Similarly, New 
York courts have held that “land which is held by a municipality in its 
proprietary capacity is not immune from adverse possession.”163 Courts 
have offered several justifications for treating “governmental” and  
“proprietary” property differently in connection with adverse possession. 
These justifications include the theory that only governmental property is 
held in a kind of trust,164 or that land held in proprietary capacity is not in 
“true governmental use” and should be accorded no more protection than 
private property unless a statute provides to the contrary.165 One  
commentator has cogently argued that “[r]egardless of the use to which 
the land is put . . . it is an asset of the local government, [and] the current 
use of the land is irrelevant to its importance” to the public.166 However, 
the governmental/proprietary distinction continues to be actively applied 
with respect to the law of adverse possession. 
3. Zoning 
In a number of jurisdictions, municipalities are not themselves  
subject to the zoning regulations that apply to private property owners 
unless the legislature has determined otherwise.167 Zoning is an exercise 
of the police power; the traditional rationale for excluding governments 
from land use regulations is that “the state and its agencies are not bound 
by general words limiting the rights and interests of its citizens unless 
such public authorities be included within the limitation expressly or by 
                                                     
 162. Ebell v. City of Baker, 299 P. 313, 318 (Or. 1931). 
 163. Casini v. Sea Gate Ass’n, 692 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (App. Div. 1999); see also Monthie v. 
Boyle Rd. Assocs., LLC, 724 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182 (App. Div. 2001); Ammirati v. Van Wicklen, 839 
N.Y.S.2d 685, 689 (Sup. Ct. 2007). 
 164. Lewis v. Village of Lyons, 389 N.Y.S.2d 674 (App. Div. 1976). 
 165. Burbank v. Fay, 65 N.Y. 57, 72 (1875); Casini, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 678; Ammirati, 839 
N.Y.S.2d at 689. 
 166. Latovick, supra note 27, at 485–86. 
 167. 8 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 25:17, at 69–71. McQuillin cites cases from twenty states 
supporting this basic proposition. In addition to zoning, the governmental/proprietary distinction can 
make a difference in the character and complexity of the environmental review process for a project. 
See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 873 P.2d 498, 504–05 (Wash. 1994). 
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necessary implication.”168 The concept has also been expressed in terms 
of governmental functions being “essential” and therefore exempt from 
zoning,169 or that the eminent domain power in effect provides  
governments with the authority to place their facilities wherever they 
choose.170 Frequently, however, the zoning exemption for governments is 
not available if the relevant public property is held in a proprietary  
capacity.171 As in other fields of law, the governmental/proprietary  
distinction becomes a battleground as litigating parties press for  
favorable outcomes in their cases. Sewage treatment plants,172 solid 
waste facilities,173 and fairgrounds174 have all been deemed  
“governmental” rather than proprietary, and therefore the public  
properties involved were not subject to zoning requirements. In many of 
those instances the courts noted that the designation of the activities as 
“governmental” was a close call. Three commentators have noted the 
difficulties in distinguishing one function from the other and have  
suggested that either the courts or legislators should establish a  
presumption that all government land uses be subject to zoning  
restrictions absent statutory waivers or compelling circumstances.175 
E. Governmental Tax Exemptions 
Taxation is another “strong” power, inherent in the states and  
delegated by state constitutions or statutes to local governments.176  
                                                     
 168. C.J. Kubach Co. v. McGuire, 248 P. 676, 677 (Cal. 1926). 
 169. Sales, supra note 25, at 322. 
 170. George R. Wolff, The Inapplicability of Municipal Zoning Ordinances to Governmental 
Land Uses, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 698, 700–02 (1971). 
 171. ROBERT M. ANDERSON, 2 AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.03, at 480–82 (3d ed. 1986) 
(“The great difficult lies in determining which functions are governmental, and which are  
proprietary. The distinction is of ancient vintage, but it is neither clear nor stable . . . . [A]  
proprietary function of a municipal government of 1955 may become a governmental function in 
1965.”); see also Sales, supra note 25, at 322–23. 
 172. City of Scottsdale v. Mun. Ct. of Tempe, 368 P.2d 637, 639–40 (Ariz. 1962); Jefferson 
County v. City of Birmingham, 55 So. 2d 196, 200 (Ala. 1951). 
 173. Nehrbas v. Inc. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 140 N.E.2d 241, 243–44 (N.Y. 1957). 
 174. Book-Cellar, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 721 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
 175. Governmental Immunity from Local Zoning Ordinances, supra note 25, at 879–80; Sales, 
supra note 25, at 328; Wolff, supra note 170, at 704–05, 713. 
 176. 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 44:5, at 23–27. The early Supreme Court held that a state 
could contract away its taxing power when its legislature has expressly declared its intent to do so. 
Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 560 (1830); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 164, 167–68 (1812). More than a dozen state constitutions contain express prohibitions on 
the reduction of taxing powers by contract: ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 1; 
HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; LA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 2; MINN. CONST. art. X, § 1; MO. CONST. art. X, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. VIII, §2; N.Y. CONST. 
art. XVI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see 
also Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 93 P. 70, 74 (Cal. 1907), aff’d 216 
U.S. 358 (1910) (holding that the local government taxing power cannot be contracted away). 
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However, government property is itself widely exempt from property 
taxes on the theory that a tax levy would be necessary to pay the taxes 
imposed, thus taking money from one pocket and putting it in the  
other.177 Some state constitutions protect all forms of state and local  
government property from property taxation, 178 while some others  
authorize the legislature to provide such exemptions.179 In one Florida 
case, local government property used for a race track was deemed  
proprietary and not public property and was therefore subject to tax.180 
Excise taxes are often imposed on municipal activities.181 The federal 
government has long been permitted to charge excise taxes to states and 
their political subdivisions when engaged in proprietary enterprises.182 At 
the state level, statutes can cause the incidence of a tax to vary depending 
on whether the relevant activity is “governmental” or “proprietary” in 
character.183 For example, in Department of Treasury v. City of Linton,184 
the legislature had imposed a gross income tax upon the income of every 
“person” engaged in a business activity. “Persons” included municipal 
corporations “engaged in private or proprietary activities or business.”185 
The City of Linton argued that its water, gas, and electric utilities were 
governmental activities and thus tax exempt.186 The Indiana Supreme 
                                                     
 177. 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 44:72, at 280, § 44:80, at 317; Seasongood, supra note 2, 
at 931. 
 178. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b); KAN. CONST. art XI, § 1(b); WASH. CONST.  
art. VII, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a); 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 44:73, at 293–94. 
 179. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 6; IND. CONST. art. X, § 1(a). 
 180. See Sebring Airport Auth. v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072, 1073–74 (Fla. 1994); see also 
Village of Watkins Glen v. Hager, 252 N.Y.S. 146, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1931); City of Providence v. Hall, 
142 A. 156, 158 (R.I. 1928). 
 181. 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 44:72, at 287–89. For example, Washington State’s sales 
tax statute includes in the definition of a “buyer” subject to the tax, any “municipal corporation, 
quasi municipal corporation, and also the state, its departments and institutions and all political 
subdivisions thereof, irrespective of the nature of the activities engaged in or functions performed.” 
WASH. REV. CODE § 82.08.010(3) (2014); see also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6005 (West 2015); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.51 (2015). 
 182. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905). In Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985), the Supreme Court rejected the  
extension of South Carolina’s jurisprudence on “traditional” versus proprietary functions for  
determining whether a specific governmental function should be immune from federal regulation 
under the Commerce Clause. Justice Blackmun noted: “To say that the distinction between  
‘governmental’ and ‘proprietary’ proved to be stable . . . would be something of an overstatement.” 
469 U.S. at 541–42. 
 183. 16 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 44:74, at 299–300. For example, Washington State’s sales 
tax statute includes in the definition of a “buyer” subject to sales tax, “the state, its departments and 
institutions and all political subdivisions thereof, irrespective of the nature of the activities engaged 
in or functions performed, and also the United States or any instrumentality thereof.” WASH. REV. 
CODE § 82.08.010(3) (2014). 
 184. Dep’t of Treasury v. City of Linton, 60 N.E.2d 948, 949 (Ind. 1945). 
 185. Id. at 949. 
 186. Id. at 950. 
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Court treated each of those enterprises as “a private and proprietary  
activity,” and therefore the utility revenue was subject to an income 
tax.187 
In contrast, in King County v. City of Algona,188 the Supreme Court 
of Washington held that while cities had been authorized by statute to 
impose gross receipts taxes on businesses, express statutory authority 
was necessary to impose excise taxes on a “governmental function,” in 
this instance a county-operated solid waste transfer station.189 But in City 
of Wenatchee v. Chelan County Pubic Utility District No. 1,190 a city’s 
tax on a municipal electrical utilities revenue was upheld because the 
utility district was operating as the proprietor of a business rather than 
engaging in a “governmental” activity.191 A concurring opinion  
bemoaned the difficulties of distinguishing “governmental” from  
“proprietary” functions.192 
In his 1936 article, Seasongood argued that “if a city deems it  
advisable and has the power to engage in a certain activity, so long as the 
activity is for a public purpose and does not offend against any  
constitutional prohibition, that effort, no matter how styled, ought to be 
free from the interference of taxation.”193 However, the  
governmental/proprietary distinction has continued to be used in various 
tax contexts at the local government level. 
F. Mindless Application of Labels 
What frustrates people the most about the governmental/proprietary 
distinction is the tendency of courts to borrow the “governmental” or 
“proprietary” label from a case generated in a different field of law or 
from a different jurisdiction without thinking about (or explaining) 
whether the application of the label makes sense in the case at hand. This 
willy-nilly labeling of municipal activities is why Felix Frankfurter 
                                                     
 187. Id. See also Colo. Dep’t. of Revenue v. City of Aurora, 32 P.3d 590, 592 (Colo. App. 
2001) (finding that sales tax can be charged to city when acting in proprietary capacity by renting 
golf carts); Dep’t of Treasury v. Evansville, 60 N.E.2d 952, 954 (Ind. 1945) (holding that markets, 
wharfs, golf courses, airports, and cemeteries were “proprietary” and their revenues were subject to 
taxation); City of Lakeland v. Amos, 143 So. 744, 747 (Fla. 1932) (determining that business and 
occupation tax may be imposed on a municipal electric utility). 
 188. King County v. City of Algona, 681 P.2d 1281 (Wash. 1984). 
 189. Id. at 1283. But see Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist. v. City of Phoenix,  
631 P.2d 553, 557 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a city could not tax an irrigation project even 
though it was a proprietary enterprise, because irrigation was the primary function of the special 
purpose district). 
 190. 325 P.3d 419 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). 
 191. Id. at 425. 
 192. Id. at 431–34; see supra text accompanying note 20. 
 193. Seasongood, supra note 2, at 931. 
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called the governmental/proprietary distinction the “quagmire that has 
long plagued the law of municipal corporations.”194 This practice is what 
leads to the operation of a public park being dubbed “proprietary” so the 
heirs of a drowned man could maintain a tort action against a city,195 
while another case treats parks and parkways as “governmental” so that a 
city cannot enter into contracts limiting its future legislative choices  
regarding their operation.196 The same practice leads to a solid waste  
facility being labeled “proprietary” so that property owners could  
maintain a tort action against a city for careless operation of machinery 
that caused a fire,197 while another solid waste facility was treated as 
“governmental” and therefore immune from taxation by a city burdened 
with the costs of garbage trucks rumbling over its streets on their way to 
a transfer station.198 
The lack of a rational basis for treating different government  
services differently for purposes of tort liability led many courts and  
legislatures to narrow sovereign immunity so that most municipal  
services were similarly vulnerable to damage actions.199 However, the 
earlier labels assigned to certain services outlived tort reform and  
continued to pop up in other areas of law, so that local governments 
might be constrained in making long-term promises concerning parks 
and roads (i.e., in the “governmental” domain), or barred from taxing a 
solid waste handling facility (“governmental”) while being allowed to 
tax an electrical utility (“proprietary”).200 It may or may not make sense 
to permit cities to collect excise taxes from other governments that  
provide public services within those cities, but neither the rationale for a 
tax policy decision nor a rule on long-term municipal contracting bears 
much relationship to a rule on tort liability. Fundamentally, the  
governmental/proprietary distinction does not translate well between  
various fields of law. 
                                                     
 194. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955). 
 195. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 163 N.E. 732, 734 (N.Y. 1928). 
 196. State ex rel. Townsend v. Bd. of Park Comm’rs of Minneapolis, 110 N.W. 1121, 1123 
(Minn. 1907). 
 197. Chardkoff Junk Co. v. City of Tampa, 135 So. 457, 461 (Fla. 1931) (stating that the city 
operated a garbage incinerator “for its quasi private corporate advantage”). 
 198. King County v. City of Algona, 681 P.2d 1281 (Wash. 1984). 
 199. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 200. Compare City of Algona, 681 P.2d at 1283, with City of Wenatchee v. Chelan Cty. Pub. 
Util. Dist. No. 1, 325 P.3d 419, 431–32 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). 
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II. BACK TO THE FUTURE: A COMPREHENSIVE REALIGNMENT OF THE 
GOVERNMENTAL/PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION 
To make any sense out of the governmental/proprietary distinction 
we need to go back to its roots. Some have advocated for its  
eradication,201 or at least its expungement from certain areas of law.202 
But we should not discount the original purpose of the concept just  
because lawyers and judges managed to make it so confusing over the 
course of two centuries. The underlying purpose of the distinction was 
simultaneously to protect and constrain the strong, coercive powers of 
municipalities, and to protect basic organs of democratic government. 
Those strong powers consisted, first and foremost, of the police power, 
plus the powers of taxation and eminent domain. These were the tools of 
regulation and the extraction of needed revenue and property. Dillon  
accurately reflected the attitudes of the late nineteenth-century legal  
establishment when he wrote that these powers were extremely important 
but that they needed to be granted sparingly and kept under control.203 
When we review Griffith’s and others’ summaries of the rationales  
offered for the governmental/proprietary distinction,204 a few (but just a 
few) of those explanations make sense today. These include the concepts 
that municipalities perform certain functions that are “essential” or  
“necessary” for the protection of public health, safety, and welfare (i.e., 
the police power) and for the survival and maintenance of common  
government (i.e., taxation, eminent domain, budgeting, and  
appropriation). Not coincidentally, these are the governmental powers 
that have been treated as “attributes of sovereignty.”205 However, the fact 
that they have been labeled as sovereign powers does not per se make 
them eligible for special treatment. A major weakness of our common 
law is the sloppy use of labels and doctrines both by lawyers and by  
appellate judges who fail to review in each case the core reason for a 
doctrine and fail to thoughtfully evaluate whether that doctrine truly fits 
the situation. Sometimes judges prefer a mechanical test because it helps 
them justify the outcome they desire in a case while avoiding the hard 
analyses and the tough policy choices. But just because a service  
historically has been provided by governments is not a valid rationale for 
                                                     
 201. See, e.g., Seasongood, supra note 2, at 910, 941–42. 
 202. See Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 141 A.2d 308, 311 (N.J. 1958). 
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 204. See supra notes 14–21 and accompanying text. 
 205. Griffith, supra note 3, at 306–07. 
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labeling it “governmental”206 and treating that activity the same as other 
traditional governmental functions like the police power. It is equally 
senseless to deem a local government activity “proprietary” solely  
because it has been performed frequently by the private sector207 without 
evaluating the qualitative differences between that activity and others. 
For example, electricity was initially generated and sold by the private 
sector208 but within a few decades it was generated and sold by municipal 
utilities in many parts of the country.209 Does that make the provision of 
electricity “historically private”? And why should the government’s  
provision of needed electrical power be treated differently in doctrinal 
areas such as breadth of municipal authority, or alienating powers by 
contract, or torts, or property law, than the provision of highways, which 
historically was more likely (but not necessarily) carried out by public 
agencies?210 Similarly, the fact that the state mandates that local  
governments perform a specific task211 does not tell us anything about 
why legal doctrine should treat that task as “governmental.” 
While there has been repeated and thoughtful criticism of the  
governmental/proprietary distinction, we should not lose sight of the fact 
that the police power to enact regulations, and the authority to carry out 
those regulations through law enforcement or code enforcement, are  
intrinsic governmental powers for a reason—we do not really want  
private enforcement of societal norms. Similarly, taxation, eminent  
domain, and budgeting are necessarily coercive powers (and solely  
public powers) that need to be both protected and constrained. 
The approach recommended here is that for purposes of legal and 
policy analysis, the “governmental” powers category should be narrowed 
                                                     
 206. See id. at 314. 
 207. See id. 
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to something close to its original definition, i.e., intrinsically  
governmental strong powers such as the police power, law enforcement, 
and the powers of taxation, eminent domain, and budgeting. All other 
government services should be lumped together, including (1) general 
services such as schools, roads, public transportation, fire protection, and 
parks, i.e., tax-funded public goods that were often (but inconsistently) 
placed in the “governmental” category, and (2) the fee-based  
“business-like” proprietary activities such as ports and airports, and the 
electric, water, solid waste, and sewer and storm water utilities. All of the 
activities described above are performed by local government, so the 
term “governmental” should not be assigned to just one group of powers 
or activities. The newly aligned categories could be called “governmental 
sovereign powers” on the one hand, and “governmental service  
activities” on the other:  
 
Governmental Sovereign Powers 
 
Governmental Service Activities 
 
Police (Regulatory) Powers Schools 
Law Enforcement (police & code  
enforcement) 
Roads & Transportation Systems 
Taxation Parks 
Budgeting, Appropriations & Borrowing Fire Fighting & Life Safety 
Eminent Domain Electric Power 
Legislative Policy Decisions Water, Wastewater, & Storm  
Water Systems 
 Solid Waste Handling 
 
Corporate “toolkit” powers, such as the power to hire, train, and fire 
employees; purchase, sell, and lease property; and carry out public 
works, should not be placed in either category. They are simply what 
Dillon called the “mode” (i.e., tools) to carry out the substantive  
sovereign powers or service activities.212 Local governments have those 
tools either by implication from having been granted substantive  
powers213 or they can be expressly granted by statute. One can also think 
of taxation, eminent domain, budgeting, and borrowing as means to carry 
out substantive responsibilities, but they are strong corporate powers 
with a coercive element and they have always been regarded as inherent 
or “sovereign” powers of a state. Consequently, for analytical purposes 
they should be included in the list of “governmental sovereign powers.” 
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The proposed realignment of local government powers is basically 
a functional approach, with the “governmental sovereign powers”  
matching what Griffith identified as powers that many courts had  
determined were inalienable by contract.214 Griffith critiqued the  
“function test” on the grounds that it works only when agreement exists 
as to which functions should go into which category, and because there 
remains a risk that judges will mechanically slot activities into a category 
without thinking about the underlying rationale.215 However, the  
existence of difficult interpretive issues in the application of a legal  
doctrine should not encourage people to drop that doctrine in its entirety. 
Indeed, if we could create analytical frameworks that were always easy 
to apply, we might not need judges at all. Griffith’s recommended  
approach, which involves multiple balancing tests and judgment calls in 
the governmental contracting context, 216 is likely to be as difficult to use 
as any other framework. Her standards for when a long-term municipal 
contract should be upheld include whether that contract “advances a  
governmental interest that outweighs the loss of governmental control,” 
and whether that contract restrains governmental functions “no further 
than necessary.”217 These criteria are just as hard to apply as the various 
criteria that have been used to place a local government activity in the 
“governmental” or the “proprietary” box. 
The key is to identify a fairly narrow set of governmental sovereign 
powers so that there is general agreement on the category. The  
regrouping of powers proposed in this article yields a limited category of 
governmental sovereign powers and a broad category of governmental 
service activities. Practical application of this division should not be such 
a tall order. By moving all government services into a single category, 
there will be very little opportunity for arbitrary assignments of an  
activity. 
III. APPLYING THE REALIGNED CATEGORIES TO DOCTRINAL AREAS 
WHERE THE GOVERNMENTAL/PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION HAS BEEN 
FREQUENTLY USED 
This section applies the proposed realignment in each of seven  
specific areas of law where the governmental/proprietary distinction has 
                                                     
 214. Griffith, supra note 3, at 328–29. 
 215. Id. at 329–30. 
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been used.218 It suggests some of the key choices that lawmakers and 
judges would make when deciding policies and cases involving the local 
government powers within each of the realigned categories. In most  
areas of law, legislatures (not courts) are the best place for making the 
relevant policy decisions, whether those choices concern, for example, 
broadening tort liability for previously “governmental” services or  
protecting government property from taxation or non-compensated  
condemnation. However, both legislators and judges should benefit from 
looking at the policy and legal issues from an analytical perspective that 
groups the strong “sovereign” powers in one category and all the public 
services in another.219 
A. Applying the Realigned Groupings to Legislative Grants of Municipal 
Authority 
As described above, the traditional rule is that when a local  
government exercises “governmental” powers, its authority to engage in 
a substantive field of activity is limited and must be traced to a statutory 
or constitutional grant, but when a municipality acts in a “proprietary” 
capacity its powers are said to be broader and more flexible (at least once 
the underlying authority to engage in that proprietary activity has been 
granted).220 Confusion has arisen when different courts have shoehorned 
specific services like parks, fire hydrants, streets, traffic control, and  
solid waste handling in one category or the other, depending on the facts 
and the equities in specific cases.221 Instead, we could treat all services 
within the same category regardless of whether they are tax-funded  
public goods like parks and schools, or rate-funded services to  
                                                     
 218. The seven areas of law discussed in this article are the main categories in which the  
governmental/proprietary distinction has been frequently used, but they by no means represent an 
exclusive list. For example, in addition to zoning, the governmental/proprietary distinction can make 
a difference in the character and complexity of the environmental review process for a project. See, 
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2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 19:2, at 19-8 (2015). 
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may still overlap. For example, when a city condemns property for a new park it is exercising a 
coercive “sovereign” power to support a direct service activity., but these are still distinct types of 
power. Parks and recreation is a “governmental service activity,” while the use of eminent domain is 
the exercise of a “governmental sovereign power.” 
 220. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 4–13 and accompanying text. 
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consumers like electricity, water, or sewer service. These services are 
similar in material respects. They are all needed and consumed by the 
public; they are provided by local government agencies because  
policymakers at one time or another decided that it made sense to have 
them governmentally provided; traditional public goods like parks are 
often tax-funded and “free” to users, but fees are often imposed for  
playfields, reserved picnic areas, and zoos. Further, while consumers 
have considerable discretion about whether and how much of a  
municipal utility service like electricity to purchase, the use of solid 
waste, wastewater, and storm water service is often mandatory even 
though those services are organized as “proprietary” utilities and funded 
through rates.222 
In the context of determining whether the authority to provide these 
services should be strictly or flexibly construed, there is no logical reason 
to treat parks, streets, and schools differently from electric, water, and 
sewer service. One can legitimately argue that because of their coercive 
characteristics, local police power, taxation, and eminent domain powers 
(i.e., governmental sovereign powers) should require express  
constitutional or statutory authority, and the exercise of those powers 
should be tightly constrained. Dillon might have been right about this. 
But once basic authority exists for the delivery of government services of 
any kind, local governments should have considerable discretion and 
flexibility in how those services are provided. In the doctrinal area of 
legislative grants of municipal authority, replacing a  
“governmental/proprietary” test with a “sovereign powers/service  
activities” test would be helpful. 
B. Applying the Realigned Groupings to Government Contracts and 
“Contracting Away” Inalienable Governmental Rights and Duties 
Griffith focused her excellent study on the analytical weakness of 
the governmental/proprietary distinction in the context of local  
government contracts—most importantly, agreements that might bargain 
away inalienable “governmental” powers. She persuasively documented 
how courts would label certain activities “governmental” without  
providing a careful rationale for doing so and how those activities would 
then fall into the “inalienable” category, thereby restricting the ability of 
a current government to enter into long-term contracts with respect to 
                                                     
 222. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 57.08.005(9) (2014) (The water–sewer district may compel 
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those activities because the contract might limit the future discretion of 
elected officials.223 
However, if we substitute a narrow category of “governmental  
sovereign powers” for the old “governmental” category, we find the  
issue of inalienable powers much easier to address and apply. We can 
restrict the items in the new classification to what Griffith called the  
“nucleus” of the traditional “governmental” classification: the powers of 
taxation, eminent domain, budgeting and appropriation, and the police 
power.224 These, along with law enforcement225 and discretionary  
policymaking, are the inherent (i.e., sovereign) powers of the states and 
their political subdivisions that most people expect should be under the 
control of elected officials—as the voters may change those officials 
from time to time. At the same time, by moving governmental services 
from the inalienable powers category into a new cluster with so-called 
proprietary powers, we are now able to treat parks, schools, and roads the 
same as water service, sewers, airports, and other services. Absent a  
constitutional or statutory prohibition, there would no longer be any 
question about the validity of a city council entering into a multi-year 
contract (with requisite consideration) to build and maintain a highway to 
assist a private development or to agree with a neighborhood to operate a 
swimming pool. These are simply governmental service activities, and 
municipalities could commit to providing those activities on a long-term 
basis in the same way that they can commit to providing water or  
electrical service to a private manufacturer. 
C. Applying the Realigned Groupings to Tort Liability 
The primary problem with the governmental/proprietary distinction 
in the field of tort liability is that courts frequently have shifted local 
government activities from the “governmental” box to the “proprietary” 
box to explain decisions that allow damage recoveries from  
municipalities.226 This is not to say that the plaintiffs should not have had 
an opportunity to receive damages, but the judicial practice of moving 
activities like parks, highways, auditoriums, and street maintenance from 
one box to another227 resulted in doctrinal inconsistency and confusion 
when the governmental/proprietary distinction was raised in later cases 
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involving the same activities but in a different field of law such as  
eminent domain, taxation, or government contracts. 
The governmental/proprietary distinction no longer causes much 
trouble in the tort context within the many states that now allow damage 
actions in connection with most local government activities. But in the 
states where sovereign immunity has not been abrogated or replaced with 
a comprehensive statute prescribing where and when persons may bring 
tort actions against governments,228 the proposed realignment of  
municipal activities would be of substantial benefit. All government  
services would be treated the same for purposes of analyzing tort  
liability, whether the services are schools and parks (traditionally  
“governmental”) or electricity and water (traditionally “proprietary”). 
Regulatory enactments under the police power would continue to be  
exempt from liability for damages, as would taxation and budgeting. 
Recovery for losses from the exercise of one governmental  
sovereign power—eminent domain—would continue to be handled 
through constitutionally mandated compensation for takings. But there 
would be no distinction between municipal liability for negligent action 
or inaction in a park and picnic area operated by a city’s parks  
department and liability for the same action or inaction in a park and  
picnic area adjacent to a hydroelectric dam that is operated by a public 
utility district (a “proprietary” entity).229 Discretionary immunity could 
remain in place with respect to legislative and high-level executive  
policy choices, as it has endured in many jurisdictions where sovereign 
immunity has been abrogated or substantially modified.230 
Legislators and courts would still have to make difficult choices 
with respect to the public duty doctrine231 because the reclassification of 
a service such as fire protection from the traditional “governmental”  
category to the proposed “governmental service activities” category 
makes no difference in terms of the tort doctrine of public duty versus 
special duty. While any difference in the treatment of parks operated by 
cities versus those operated by municipal utilities is artificial, the  
distinction between a generalized public duty and a duty of care through 
a special relationship (special duty) is not artificial at all. 
Judges and lawmakers will have to keep grappling with the public 
duty doctrine, but they will be required to do so based on what makes 
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sense from a policy standpoint rather than how an activity has arbitrarily 
been labeled. Further, because all local government services (other than 
law and code enforcement) would be grouped together, there will be an 
immediate reduction in the number of seemingly arbitrary court rulings 
based on the designation of a particular municipal service as  
“governmental” or “proprietary.” 
D. Applying the Realigned Groupings to Property Law 
A realignment of local government activities between governmental 
sovereign powers and governmental service activities will help lawyers 
and judges when they analyze several issues related to municipal  
property and local government regulation of property. 
With respect to state condemnation of municipal property, the  
proposed realignment would remove an artificial distinction that in some 
states has led to taxpayer losses when school, park, road, and other  
traditionally “governmental” properties were taken by state government 
without compensating local taxpayers.232 To the extent that common law 
courts are faced with the question, the proposed realignment would make 
judicial decisions much easier and would provide badly needed  
consistency. Under the approach proposed in this article, school, park, 
and road properties would be treated the same as utility, port, and airport 
properties. Presumably, but not necessarily, compensation would be paid 
for all municipal properties. A 1967 Columbia Law Review case note 
made a good argument that “the inhabitants of a municipal corporation 
often lose something when its property is taken. The fact of  
particularized loss should be sufficient to give a right to compensation to 
the unit of government.”233 Compensation to local taxpayers for  
condemned nonutility property, similar to compensating local ratepayers 
when utility property is taken, appears to be both consistent and equitable 
in terms of cost allocation. However, this is appropriately a choice for 
legislators. 
The realignment of municipal powers would also provide  
consistency in the law of adverse possession of local government  
property, although it would not answer the underlying question of 
whether private sector persons should be able to acquire any public  
property through adverse possession. Under the approach proposed in 
this article, school, park, and road properties would be treated the same 
as utility, port, and airport properties. All those properties either would, 
or would not, be subject to adverse possession. Paula Latovick makes an 
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excellent argument that there are few, if any, good reasons not to protect 
local government property, regardless of its current use.234 Public  
property is public property. As Latovick observes, public lands are held 
in trust and it is not easy for governments to regularly inspect the large 
number of odd parcels that they acquire over the years. However, this is 
a question that ought to be handled by legislators. To the extent that it is 
addressed by courts, moving traditionally “governmental” property into a 
category with traditionally “proprietary” property might suggest that  
adverse possession of all public assets should be allowed. 
In the law of zoning, as in condemnation and adverse possession, 
the governmental/proprietary distinction has caused doctrinal confusion, 
and treating all municipal properties alike will provide needed  
consistency. As in the fields of condemnation and adverse possession, 
legislators rather than courts are in the best position to make the policy 
call of whether local government zoning laws should apply to public 
properties. In some jurisdictions, local officials have handled the issue by 
expressly building public uses like fire stations and schools into  
residential zones.235 To the extent that courts have to address the  
question, there is practical merit to the proposal that all government land 
uses be subject to zoning restrictions absent express statutory waivers or 
special circumstances.236 
E. Applying the Realigned Groupings to Taxation and Tax Exemptions 
 
Immunity from taxation is another doctrinal area where the  
distinction between “governmental” services and “proprietary” services 
makes relatively little sense. The argument can be made that municipal 
properties that host tax-backed activities such as fire stations, schools, 
and roads should be exempt from property taxation because otherwise we 
would see revenue moving from one governmental pocket into another, 
and taxpayers being taxed to pay taxes. However, if one accepts that  
argument, then those activities should be similarly immune from excise 
taxes as well—but local governments are regularly forced to pay sales 
taxes when they purchase goods and services.237 To the extent that both 
property and excise taxation of municipal utilities are seen as appropriate 
because these “business-like” functions should pay their fair share of 
public services like roads, police, and fire protection, one legitimately 
can argue that traditional governmental activities (e.g., schools) also use 
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roads, police, and fire protection and that prudent cost allocation  
practices would charge a share of those services to the school district. 
Further, some “governmental” facilities such as golf courses and zoos 
operate as separate cost centers and charge user fees. Accordingly, 
shouldn’t they be taxed the same as an electric utility?238 Alternatively, 
should all government functions be completely free from the interference 
of taxation, as Seasongood argued in 1936?239 After all, taxation of  
utilities is often seen as a mechanism to unfairly push costs of general 
government onto utility ratepayers because rates frequently are not  
subject to the types of constitutional and statutory limits that apply to 
taxes.240 
Many state constitutions provide local government with tax  
exemptions, particularly from property taxes.241 Nevertheless,  
legislatures retain a fair amount of discretion to tax or not tax local  
government property and activities. The realignment of activities that is 
proposed in this article takes the question of tax immunity out of the  
vagaries of judicial assignment or reassignment in the context of  
individual cases. All governmental services, property, and activities 
would be treated the same for property taxes and for excise taxes,  
respectively; it would be up to constitutions and statutes to specify, based 
on policy choices, which properties and activities deserve tax immunity. 
CONCLUSION 
The governmental/proprietary distinction has created substantial 
confusion among municipal lawyers and judges, principally because the 
original rationale for a “governmental” category became lost as the  
number of local government services expanded—both new services like 
schools and parks that were viewed as “governmental,” and new utility 
services that came to be seen as “proprietary.” The “governmental”  
services were grouped analytically with traditional inherent  
(“sovereign”) powers such as the police power, law enforcement,  
taxation, and eminent domain. As a result, judges came to treat these 
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governmental services the same as the strong, coercive powers of local 
government when analyzing legal questions in a variety of rather  
different fields of law: municipal authority, contracting, torts, property, 
and taxation. Because of the all-too-frequent lawyer practice of grabbing 
a label from one court opinion that sounds like it might apply to a  
problem in an altogether different field of law, and because of the  
all-too-frequent judicial practice of accepting a label without digging into 
the underlying rationale to see if it really fits the case, there were scores 
of inconsistent decisions about whether a particular governmental  
activity was to be treated as “governmental” or “proprietary.” 
Not all of the difficult questions about municipal powers, tort  
liability, property, or taxation can be solved by the realignment of local 
government services as proposed in this article. However, the analysis 
and the outcomes are much more likely to be more consistent, and easier 
to analyze, if we group all governmental services together, leaving the 
strong powers in a category that resembles the original “governmental 
powers” category of the early nineteenth century. Just because an  
analytical concept is nearly two centuries old does not mean that it is 
outmoded. There were very good reasons for a New York court to rule in 
Brick Presbyterian Church242 that the city of New York could not  
lawfully contract away its public health regulatory functions through a 
deed covenant. 
There are good reasons for governments to be immune from suit for 
private losses resulting from legitimate land use regulations or legislative 
choices.243 However, the legal rationales for the early “governmental 
powers” decisions do not work well when they are applied in cases 
where the governmental/proprietary distinction is pivotal in determining 
whether or not a city might be liable in tort for an accident at a park  
versus a leaking dam or a highway, or whether a state can seize  
municipal property without compensating local taxpayers, or whether 
public property might be lost through adverse possession, or whether 
zoning does or does not apply to a new city hall versus a new public 
utilities building. Courts will have an easier time working through these 
issues if all the nonenforcement services of local government are  
realigned with the so-called “proprietary” functions for purposes of  
analysis in the future. 
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